A mental model is an explanation of someone’s thought process about how things work in the real world. It is a representation of the surrounding world, the relationships between its various parts and a person’s intuitive perception about its own acts and their consequences. Mental models can help shape behavior and set an approach to solving problems (similar to a personal algorithm ) and doing tasks.
A mental model is a kind of internal symbol or representation of external reality, hypothesized to play a major role in cognition , reasoning and decision-making . Kenneth Craiksuggested in 1943 that the mind constructs “small-scale models” of reality that it uses to anticipate events.
Jay Wright Forrester defined general mental models as:
The image of the world around us, which we carry in our head, is just a model. Nobody in his head imagines all the world, government or country. (Forrester, 1971). In this paper, we present the results of the study.
In psychology, the term mental models is sometimes used to refer to mental representations or mental simulation generally. At other times it is used to Refer to § Mental models and reasoning and to the mental model theory of reasoning developed by Philip Johnson-Laird and Ruth MJ Byrne .
The term mental model is believed to have originated with Kenneth Craik in his 1943 book The Nature of Explanation .   Georges-Henri Luquet in The Child ‘s Drawings, published in 1927 by Alcan, Paris, argued that children construct internal models, a view that influenced, among others, child psychologist Jean Piaget .
Philip Johnson-Laird published Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference and Consciousness in 1983. In the same year, Dedre Gentner and Albert Stevens edited a collection of titles in Mental Models .  The first line of their book explains the idea further: “One function of this chapter is to belabor the obvious, of themselves, of their own capabilities, and of the tasks that they are asked to perform , Or topics they are asked to learn, depend heavily on the conceptualizations that they bring to the task. ” (See the book: Mental Models ).
Since then, there has-been much debate and use of the idea in human-computer interaction and usability by Researchers Including Donald Norman and Steve Krug (In His book Do not Make Me Think ). Walter Kintsch and Teun A. van Dijk , using the term situation model (in their book Strategies of Discourse Comprehension , 1983), showed the relevance of mental models for the production and comprehension of discourse .
Mental models and reasoning
One view of human reasoning is that it depends on mental models. In this view, mental models can be constructed from perception, imagination, or the comprehension of discourse (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Such mental models are similar to architects ‘models or to physicists’ diagrams in which their structure is analogous to the structure of the situation that they represent, unlike, say, the structure of logical forms used in formal rule theories of reasoning. In this respect, They Are a little like pictures in the picture theory of language Described by philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in 1922. Philip Johnson-Laird and Ruth MJ Byrne Developed a theory of mental models qui Makes the assumption That reasoning depends, not one logical form ,
Principles of mental models
Mental models are based on a fundamental set of assumptions ( axioms ), which distinguish them from other representations in the psychology of reasoning (Byrne and Johnson-Laird, 2009). Each mental model represents a possibility. A mental model represents one possibility, capturing what is common to all possible ways in which the possibility may occur (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002). Mental models are iconic, ie, each part of a model corresponds to each part of what it represents (Johnson-Laird, 2006). Mental models are based on a principle of truth: they typically represent only those situations that are possible, and each model of a possibility. However, mental models can represent what is false,
Reasoning with mental models
People infer that a conclusion is valid if it holds in all the possibilities. Procedures for reasoning with mental models rely on counter-examples to refute invalid inferences; They establish themselves by means of which they hold all the models of the premises. Reasoners focus on a model of multiple-model problems, often just a single model. The ease with which reasoners can make deductions is affected by many factors, including age and working memory (Barrouillet, et al., 2000). They reject a conclusion if they find a counterexample, ie, a possibility in which the premises hold, but the conclusion does not (Schroyens et al., 2003, Verschueren, et al., 2005).
Scientific ongoing debate about whether human reasoning is based are mental models, versus formal rules of inference (eg, O’Brien, 2009), domain-specific rules of inference (eg, Cheng & Holyoak, 2008; Cosmides, 2005), or probabilities (Eg, Oaksford and Chater, 2007). Many empirical comparisons of the different theories have been carried out (eg, Oberauer, 2006).
Mental models of dynamics systems
A mental model is generally:
- Founded on unquantifiable, impugnable, obscure, incomplete gold facts
- Flexible – is considerably variable in positive
- an information filter – causes selective perception , perception of only selected parts of information
- very limited , Compared with the Complexities of the world, and Even When a scientific model extensively and is in accord avec has some reality in the derivation of logical consequences of it, it must take into account Such restrictions as working memory ; Ie, rules on the maximum number of elements that can be remembered, gestaltisms or failure of the principles of logic , etc.
- The hotel is located in the heart of the city.   
Mental models are a fundamental way to understand organizational learning. Mental models, in popular science parlance, have been described as “deeply held images of thinking and acting”.  Mental models are so basic to understanding the world that they are hardly conscious of them.
Expression of mental models of dynamic systems
SN Groesser and M. Schaffernicht (2012) describe three basic methods which are typically used:
- Causal loop diagrams – displaying tendency and a direction of information connections and the resulting causality and feedback loops
- System structure diagrams – another way to express the structure of a qualitative dynamic system
- Stock and flow diagrams – a way to quantify the structure of a dynamic system
These methods allow a model to evolve over time. Analyzing these graphical representations has been an increasing area of research across many social science fields.  Mental Modeler, “a participatory modeling tool based on fuzzy-logic cognitive mapping”,  have recently been developed and used to Collect / compare / combine mental model representations collected from individuals for social science research, collaborative decision-making, and natural resource planning.
Mental model in relation to system dynamics and systemic thinking
In the simplification of reality, Creating a model can find a sense of reality, seeking to Overcome systemic thinking and system dynamics .
These two disciplines can help to construct a better coordination with the reality of mental models and simulate it accurately. They increase the probability that the consequences of how to decide and act in accordance with how to plan. 
- System dynamics – extending mental models through the creation of explicit models, which are clear, easily communicated and can be compared with each other.
- Systemic thinking – seeking the means to improve the mental models and which improve the quality of dynamic decisions that are based on mental models.
Single and double-loop learning
After analyzing the basic characteristics, it is necessary to bring the process of changing the mental models, or the process of learning. Learning is a back-loop process , and feedback loops can be illustrated as: single-loop learning or double-loop learning.
Mental models affect the way people work with the information and determines the final decision. The decision itself changes, but the mental models remain the same. It is the predominant method of learning, because it is very convenient. One established mental model is fixed, so the next decision is very fast.
Double-loop learning ( see diagram below ) is used when it is necessary to change the mental model on which a decision depends. Unlike single loops, this model includes a shift in understanding, from simple and static to broader and more dynamic, such as taking into account the changes in the surroundings and the need for expression changes in mental models. 
|Process of learning|
- Cognitive map
- Cognitive psychology
- Conceptual model
- Educational psychology
- Folk psychology
- Internal model (motor control)
- Knowledge representation
- Map-territory relation
- Model-dependent realism
- Neuro-linguistic programming
- OODA loop
- Psyche (psychology)
- Social intuitionism
- Space mapping
- System dynamics
- Text and conversation theory
- Jump up^ Nersessian, Nancy J. (1992). “In the Theoretician’s Laboratory: Thought Experimenting as Mental Modeling” (PDF) . PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association . 1992 : 291-301. Doi : 10.1086 / psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192843 . Retrieved 17 July 2014 .
The Kenneth Craik in 1943. The case of Kenneth Craik.
- Jump up^ Staggers, Nancy; Norcio, AF (1993). “Mental models: concepts for human-computer interaction research” (PDF) . International Journal of Man-Machine Studies . 38 (4): 587-605. Doi : 10.1006 / imms.1993.1028. Retrieved 17 July 2014 .
Although Johnson-Laird (1989) is the credited with coining the term mental model, the history of the concept may be traced to Craik’s (1943) work entitled The Nature of Explanation .
- Jump up^ “Mental models”, report at www.lauradove.info.
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- Byrne, RMJ (2005). The Rational Imagination: How People Create Counterfactual Alternatives to Reality. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
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- Cheng, PC and Holyoak, KJ (2008) Pragmatic reasoning schemas. In Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and Its Foundations (Adler, JE and Rips, LJ, eds), pp. 827-842, Cambridge University Press
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- Oaksford, M. and Chater, N. (2007) Bayesian Rationality . Oxford University Press
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- Johnson-Laird, PN (2006) How We Reason . Oxford University Press
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- Schroyens, W. et al. (2003). In search of counterexamples: Deductive rationality in human reasoning. Quarter. J. Exp. Psychol. 56 (A), 1129-1145.
- Verschueren, N. et al. (2005). Everyday conditional reasoning: A working memory-dependent tradeoff between counterexample and likelihood use. Same. Cognit . 33, 107-119.